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COMMENTS
THE UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT:
NEW STATUTORY SOLUTIONS TO OLD PROBLEMS
Karen Townsend
I. INTRODUCTION
The 44th Legislative Assembly passed the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act' (hereinafter cited as UMDA or Act) and with this
action adopted for Montana a cohesive piece of legislation which
makes long needed reforms in domestic relations law. The UMDA
was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Law (hereinafter cited as NCCUSL) in August of
19702 as an attempt to change not only specific provisions, but also
the entire conceptual framework that underlies the law of marriage
and divorce. In particular, the "traditional conception of divorce
based on fault has been singled out . . . both as an ineffective
barrier to marriage dissolution which is regularly overcome by per-
jury, thus promoting disrespect for the law and its processes, and
as an unfortunate device which adds to the bitterness and hostility
of divorce proceedings." 3
As a result of initial and continued opposition from the ABA
Family Law Section, the UMDA did not receive the endorsement
of the House of Delegates of the ABA in 1972.1 However, after the
draft of a proposed revision UMDA by the Family Law Section was
completed and some critical amendments to the NCCUSL version
of the UMDA were made, the adamant opposition of the Family
Law Section was withdrawn. The UMDA received the House of
Delegates endorsement at the 1974 mid-winter meeting of the ABA.-
As of this writing, four states have either passed the UMDA or
adopted legislation substantially similar to the model act.' The pur-
l. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, (1947) (hereinafter cited as R.C.M., 1947), §48-301 et.
seq.
2. Zuckman, "The ABA Family Law Section v. The NCCUSL: Alienation, Separation,
and Forced Reconciliation Over the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 24 CATH. U. L. REV.
61, (1974).
3. Prefatory Note, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 5 FAM. L. Q. 205, 206 (1971).
4. Zuckman, supra note 2 at 63.
5. For more detailed versions of the dispute between the NCCUSL and the ABA Family
Law Section over the UMDA see Zuckman, supra note 2; Merrill, Section 305: Genesis and
Effect, 18 S. DAK. L. REV. 538 (1973); Foster, Divorce Reform and the Uniform Act, 18 S.
DAK. L. REV. 572 (1973); Podell, The Case for Revision of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, 18 S. DAK. L. REV. 601 (1973).
6. Letter of October 24, 1975 from John M. McCabe, Legislative Director of NCCUSL
on file at Montana Law Review Office lists Kentucky, Arizona and Colorado as having passed
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pose of this comment is to examine the key provisions of the UMDA
as passed by the Montana legislature, and point out the changes
that the Act will bring about in this state.
II. THE PROVISIONS ON MARRIAGE
A. Age of Consent
The UMDA has adopted eighteen as the age at which individu-
als may marry without parental or judicial consent.7 Additionally,
provisions are made in the Act for the marriage of individuals under
the age of 18.8 The Montana version, while accepting 18 as the age
of consent for marriage, differs from the NCCUSL draft in its provi-
sions for those under the age of 18. In Montana, parties 16 and 17
may marry if they obtain judicial approval.' Judicial approval is
dependent on parental consent, and a court finding "that the under-
aged party is capable of assuming the responsibilities of marriage
and the marriage will serve his best interest."' 0 No provisions are
made for authorizing marriages under age 16. The NCCUSL ver-
sion, on the other hand, allows marriage for those between 16 and
17 if the couple obtains the consent of either their parents or the
court, and permits the marriage of those under 16 if consent of both
the parents and the court is obtained."
The law in Montana changes only slightly with the adoption of
these age provisions of the UMDA. Prior to their adoption, 18 was
the age of consent for marriage, and the marriage of those under 18
required the approval of both the court and the parents. There was,
however, no age limit below which marriages simply could not be
contracted." By forbidding marriages below age 16, the Montana
legislature may have created problems in its attempt to prevent
them. 3
B. Prohibited Marriages
The UMDA prohibits bigamous and incestuous marriages. The
statute defines incestuous marriages as those between ancestor and
descendent, brother and sister whether the relationship is by the
the UMDA, and Washington as having passed substantially similar divorce legislation.
7. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-306(1).
8. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 48-306(1) and 48-308(1)(2).
9. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-306(1).
10. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-308. The statute goes on to specify that "Pregnancy alone does
not establish that the best interest of the party will be served."
11. UMDA § 203.
12. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-143 (repealed January 1, 1976).
13. See generally the discussion on age restrictions and youthful marriages in Note: The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act-Marital Age Provisions, 57 MINN. L. REv. 179 (1972).
[Vol. 37
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 37 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/5
MONTANA'S U.M.D.A.
half or the whole blood, or between first cousins." Once again, Mon-
tana differs from the national draft in that the NCCUSL version of
the UMDA permits marriages between first cousins, but forbids
marriages between adopted siblings, 5 while Montana prohibits
marriages between first cousins, but makes no mention of adopted
siblings. The newly adopted Montana UMDA does not differ from
the old law with respect to prohibited marriages.
C. Declaration of Invalidity
The drafters of the UMDA state in their Comment to the sec-
tion known as "Declaration of Invalidity" that: "This section is
designed to replace the traditional law of annulment of marriage."'"
Although the Montana version follows the NCCUSL version to a
large degree, the changes it makes in both grounds and time limits
represent a departure from the underlying philosophy of that na-
tional draft. The result of the Montana version is that prior statu-
tory law on annulment changes very little. Declarations of invalidity
may be given if a party lacked capacity to consent to the marriage
because of mental incapacity or infirmity, influence of alcohol,
drugs or other incapacitating substance.17 To these two grounds
from the original national draft, Montana followed the lead of the
Commissioners and their 1973 version by adding the traditional
annulment ground of inducement by force, duress, or fraud. 8 The
remaining grounds for a declaration of invalidity are lack of physical
capacity to consummate the marriage, non age, and that the mar-
riage is prohibited." By adopting these grounds, Montana's version
is consistent with both the NCCUSL version and prior Montana law
on annulment.
Differences do occur, however, in the sections governing time
limitations for bringing an action seeking a declaration of invalidity.
The national draft has specified relatively short time periods for
bringing such actions, while the Montana version generally retains
the same statutes of limitations which existed previously. 0 Two
changes in these statutes of limitations from prior Montana law are
14. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-310.
15. UMDA, § 207.
16. Comment to UMDA § 208.
17. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-311(1)(a).
18. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-311(1)(a).
19. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-311(1)(b),(c) and (d).
20. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-311(2)(a),(b)-for lack of capacity to consent due to mental
incapacity or influence of alcohol, drugs or other incapacitating substances-1 year. R.C.M.
1947, § 48-311(2)(c)-for lack of capacity to consent due to force, fraud or duress-2 years.
R.C.M. 1947, § 48-311(2)(d)-for lack of physical capacity to consummate the marriage-4
years. The national version adopts ninety (90) day time limits for lack of capacity to consent
and a 1 year time limit for lack of physical capacity. UMDA § 208(b)(1) and (2).
1976]
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made, however. First, as to underage parties, declarations of inval-
idity can be sought only until the party reaches the age of consent.
This same limitation applies both to the parties to the marriage and
to the parents or guardians.2 Under prior Montana law, while the
parent or guardian lost his right to seek annulment upon the indi-
vidual reaching the age of consent, the party to the marriage could
seek an annulment for two years after reaching the age of consent.2
The second change that will result is the limitations of actions seek-
ing a declaration of invalidity to the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage. Death of either party cuts off the possibility of seeking a
declaration of invalidity or terminates the action if it is in process.2 1
The final provision of the statute on declaration of invalidity
permits the court discretion in determining whether the marriage
should be declared invalid from the date of the marriage or from the
date of the decree. 24 This provision is obviously an attempt to re-
solve the conceptual problems caused by the "void/voidable" dis-
tinction in pre-Act annulment law,2 and to insure that a spouse or
child of an invalid marriage be protected through awards of support.
There is a danger, however, that the former distinctions of
void/voidable marriages might be read back into the law through
case decisions. Such a result would be a mistake, and would be
contrary to the intent of the drafters of the UMDA as evidenced in
their comments.2 1
One progressive step that this new statute takes is that if a
nonretroactive decree of invalidity is entered, the provisions of the
UMDA relating to property rights of the spouses, maintenance, sup-
port, and custody of children will apply. 27 Thus earlier Montana law
dictating that a wife was not entitled to permanent alimony follow-
ing an annulment 28 would no longer be applicable.
D. Common Law Marriages
The UMDA does not change Montana law on common law
marriages. The statutory provisions governing Declarations of Mar-
riage remain in full force and effect. 2
21. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-311(e).
22. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-203(1) (repealed January 1, 1976).
23. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 48-311(2) and 48-311(3). See generally Comment to UMDA § 208.
24. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-311(5).
25. For a discussion of this problem see, Comment, Bad Laws Make Hard Cases, State
Ex Rel Angvall v. District Court and The Law of Annulment In Montana, 36 MONT. L. REV.
267 (1975); Briggs, The Status of Annulment in Montana, 4 MONT. L. REv. 14 (1943).
26. See generally Prefatory Note, supra note 3 at 206.
27. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-311(5).
28. State ex rel. Wooten v. Dis. Ct. of Silver Bow County, 57 Mont. 517, 189 P.233
(1920).
29. R.C.M. 1q47; § 4A-114.
[Vol. 37
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III. THE PROVISIONS ON DISSOLUTION
A. Residency and Jurisdictional Requirements
In the past, states have imposed varying residency require-
ments on individuals before granting a divorce. Since these waiting
periods ranged from as little as six weeks in Idaho3 and Nevada,3'
to one year in many other states, 32 a plaintiff anxious to obtain a
divorce would frequently make a temporary move to a jurisdiction
with both favorable grounds and short residency requirements, wait
out the necessary time, obtain the divorce, and then return to the
home state. The adoption of uniform residency requirements would
do much to eliminate this phenomenon of migratory divorce.
One-year residency requirements for divorce, such as
Montana's, 3 have been under attack for some time for the reason
that one year was more time than is necessary to establish ties
between the individual and the state, and also because that much
time imposes a particular hardship on those too poor to forum-shop
for states with short waiting periods. Such requirements, however,
survived a constitutional challenge last year.34 The ninety-day pe-
riod of the UMDA is an ideal solution to the problems raised in such
cases.
31
The UMDA does more than shorten the time period. The basis
for jurisdiction rests on a finding of domicile of one of the parties to
the action rather than a given period of residency. Although domi-
cile is a more subjective concept than residence, it is more desirable
because its finding is required before a state decree will be given full
faith and credit in sister jurisdictions.3 The change from the use of
the word "residence" to the use of the word "domicile" in the stat-
utes will have no substantial effect on the Montana law, since the
Montana supreme court interpreted the prior statute as equating
residence and domicile.
B. Grounds
In its treatment of grounds for divorce, the UMDA makes its
most fundamental departure from the traditional statutory divorce
30. Idaho Code § 32-701 (1963).
31. Nevada Rev. Stats. § 125.020.
32. See eg. Cal. Civ. Code, § 128, enacted 1872, amended 1891; since amended to 6
months-Cal. Civ. Code § 4530.
33. R.C.M. 1947, § 21-134.
34. Sosna v. Iowa, - U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 553 (1975).
35. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-316(1)(a).
36. Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina II,
325 U.S. 226 (1945).
37. State ex rel. Duckworth v. District Court, 107 Mont. 97, 101, 80 P.2d 367 (1938).
19761
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law. By conscious design, the fault concept has been removed as a
basis for ending a marriage. 8 Under the UMDA, a decree of dissolu-
tion of marriage will be granted when "the court finds that the
marriage is irretrievably broken."3" There are no other grounds for
such a decree.
The phrase "irretrievable breakdown," engendered the most
controversy in both the development of the UMDA, and the con-
tinuing battle with the Family Law Section prior to the final en-
dorsement of the Act by the ABA.'" The drafters of the UMDA quite
consciously avoided defining that phrase in the statute. They be-
lieved that "the courts should continue to build the concept of irre-
trievable breakdown on a case-by-case basis and not be hampered
by legislative preconceptions which necessarily cannot fit all
cases."'" The Family Law Secton vigorously opposed this lack of
definition on the grounds that this vagueness "inevitably will lead
to divorce upon demand of one party."4 Their draft defined irre-
trievable breakdown in terms of proof either:
a) That the parties have lived separate and apart for a period of
more than one year preceding commencement of court action, or
b) That such serious marital misconduct had occurred so ad-
versely affecting the physical or mental health of the petitioning
party as to make it impossible for the parties to continue the mari-
tal relation, and that reconciliation is improbable;43
Proponents of the NCCUSL version of the UMDA argued that
the PR Draft of the Family Law Section imposed too lengthy time
limits to be practicable, and that by not defining "serious marital
misconduct" the draft invited judges experienced in the fault sys-
tem to require proof of old fault grounds." The final compromise
reached between the two groups is the version endorsed by the ABA
and passed by the Montana legislature. 5 Although, there may be
some possibility that fault will be read back into the statute in cases
38. Prefatory Note, supra note 3 at 207.
39. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-316(1)(b).
40. For a discussion of this controversy, see generally Zuckman, supra note 2.
41. Id. at 65. See also Merrill, supra note 5 at 549.
42. ABA Family Law Section, PROPOSED REVISED UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT,
PR DRAFT, § 302, Comment.
43. PR Draft § 302(a)(2).
44. Zuckman, supra note 2 at 65-68.
45. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-316(1)(b) provides that a court can enter a decree of dissolution
upon a finding that: the marriage is irretrievably broken, which findings shall be supported
by evidence
(i) that the parties have lived separate and apart for a period of more than one
hundred eighty (180) days next preceding the commencement of this proceeding,
or
(ii) that there is serious marital discord which adversely affects the attitude of one
or both parties towards the marriage.
[Vol. 37
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where serious marital misconduct is alleged, the intent of the
UMDA is clearly opposed to such a result. 6
The adoption of "irretrievable breakdown" as the sole ground
for a decree of dissolution makes a significant change in the Mon-
tana law. Although the state had taken a step towards the adoption
of "no-fault" divorce in 1973 with the addition of "irreconcilable
differences" to the other statutory grounds for divorce,47 the passage
of the UMDA makes the transition complete. Emphasis will no
longer be placed on the faults of the defendant, but rather upon the
status of the marriage itself.
The traditional defenses to divorce which have long been part
of the Montana statutory picture48 have also been abolished by the
UMDA.49 As a result, the sole defense to the action, other than
jurisdictional ones, is that "the marriage is not irretrievably bro-
ken."5 Although there have been few cases heard in Montana in
which one of these traditional defenses was successfully raised,5 and
although the 1965 decision of Burns v. Burns" shows that the de-
fense of recrimination has lost much of its force,53 nevertheless the
formal rejection of these defenses is a much needed reform.
C. Separation Agreements, Maintenance Awards and Property
Distribution
The basic theme of the UMDA eliminating the consideration of
any element of fault or wrong by one of the parties is carried over
to the provisions regulating property distribution following a decree
46. Prefatory Note, supra note 3 at 207.
47. R.C.M. 1947, § 21-103 (repealed effective January 1, 1976) lists as grounds for
divorce: incurable insanity, adultery, extreme cruelty, willful desertion, willful neglect, habit-
ual intemperance, conviction of a felony, and with the 1973 amendment "irreconcilable
differences which have existed and persisted for a period of six months before the commence-
ment of an action and which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage."
48. R.C.M. 1947, § 21-118 (repealed effective January 1, 1976) declares that "Divorces
must be denied upon showing of connivance, collusion, condonation and recrimination."
Additionally, for certain actions, a divorce had to be denied for an unreasonable lapse of time.
R.C.M. 1947, § 21-130 (repealed effective January 1, 1976).
49. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-317(5).
50. UMDA § 303 Comment.
51. Examples of cases which discussed these defenses: Shaw v. Shaw, 122 Mont. 593,
208 P.2d 514 (1949), petty act fully condoned cannot be grounds for divorce; Cooper v. Cooper,
92 Mont. 57, 10 P.2d 939 (1932), no connivance found as a result of continued support
payments; Farwell v. Farwell, 47 Mont. 574, 133 P. 958 (1913), no connivance found;
Bordeaux v. Bordeaux, 30 Mont. 36, 75 P. 524 (1904), continuing to live with wife after
learning of her adultery constituted condonation; Morrison v. Morrison, 14 Mont. 8, 35 P. 1
(1894), no condonation despite continued cohabitation.
52. 145 Mont. 1, 400 P.2d 642, 13 A.L.R. 3rd 1355 (1965).
53. This case is analyzed carefully in Recent Decisions, Divorce-Recrimination Is No
Longer an Absolute Defense-A Decree of Divorce May Be Awarded to Both Parties in
Certain Situations, 26 MoNT. L. REV. 254 (1965).
1976]
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of dissolution or separation. Such an approach is a major change in
the way that these matters were previously handled. In the past, the
finding of fault in one of the parties often served as justification for
not only the award itself, but often the amount of the award.54
Montana has followed the general pattern of many states and re-
fused to award alimony to a wife when the divorce was granted to
the husband.55 Additionally, there has been no provision in Mon-
tana for any award of alimony to a husband.5 The sections in the
UMDA which govern property distribution will change these past
practices.
First, property settlements are not only permitted but encour-
aged.57 Although Montana has recognized property settlement
agreements,5" such agreements were not provided for by statute. The
new statute, however, not only encourages such an agreement, but
makes it binding upon the court unless the court finds the agree-
ment "unconscionable." 5 Upon a finding of unconscionability, the
court may request the parties to file a revised agreement, or make
its own orders for disposition of the property." The agreement is also
automatically incorporated into the decree unless the agreement
provides to the contrary.6
Not only does the statute provide for the approval of property
settlement agreements, but the court is also given power to appor-
tion the property of the parties where no agreement is reached, and
if necessary make awards for continued maintenance of one of the
spouses."2 This provision reflects a new notion that the disposition
of property is to be done "like the distribution of assets incident to
54. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, §§ 14.5, 14.8
(1968).
55. See, Grush v. Grush, 90 Mont. 381, 3 P.2d 402 (1931); Albrecht v. Albrecht, 83
Mont. 37, 269 P. 158 (1928); Damm v. Damm, 82 Mont. 239, 266 P. 410 (1928); Bischoff v.
Bischoff, 70 Mont. 503, 226 P. 508 (1924). See also Annot., 34 A.L.R. 2d 313 (1954) for cases
from other jurisdictions which agree with the Montana holding.
56. R.C.M. 1947, § 21-139 (repealed effective January 1, 1976) provides that alimony
awards may be made to the wife for an offense of the husband. This statute was challenged
as unconstitutional in three recent cases: Clontz v. Clontz, - Mont.__, 531 P.2d 1003,
32 St. Rptr. 169 (1975); Grant v. Grant, __ Mont. __, 531 P.2d 1007, 32 St. Rptr. 191
(1975), and Taylor v. Taylor, __ Mont. ____ P.2d __, 32 St. Rptr. 575 (1975). The
court did not decide the constitutional question in any of these cases as there was a failure
to provide the required notice to the attorney general under Rule 38, M. R. App. Civ. P. in
the Clontz and Grant cases, and there were other grounds on which to decide the case in
Taylor.
57. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-320.
58. Clontz v. Clontz, supra note 56 at 173; Ryan v. Ryan, 111 Mont. 104, 106 P.2d 337
(1940); Grush v. Grush, 90 Mont. 381, 3 P.2d 402 (1931).
59. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-320(2).
60. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-320(3).
61. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-320(4)(a).
62. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-321.
[Vol. 37
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the dissolution of a partnership."63 In making the property division,
the judge is to look at all the relevant circumstances of the marriage
and the spouses. The court is also directed by the statute to consider
the relative contributions each spouse has made in the acquisition
of the property to be apportioned, including the "nonmonetary con-
tribution of a homemaker."64
The UMDA makes a definite policy decision not to place the
traditional reliance upon maintenance as the primary means of sup-
port for a divorced spouse. 5 However, such awards are possible, and
if they are to be made, the court is again directed to consider "all
relevant facts" except "marital misconduct." 6
The Montana law in this area will undergo some change. First,
and most importantly, marital misconduct cannot be considered in
making decisions about property division. 8 Thus case law which
refused to permit alimony awards to "guilty" wives will no longer
be applicable." Second, since maintenance awards under the
UMDA can be made to either spouse, the constitutional weakness
that the prior statute suffered will no longer be a problem.7 0 Finally,
there may be some change in the standard used to determine
whether an award should be modified. However, until there is some
case law interpreting the UMDA term "unconscionable", an exact
determination whether the law has changed cannot be made."
D. Child Custody and Support
When a marriage is dissolved and minor children are involved,
custody decisions must be made. The UMDA adopts the familiar
"best interest of the child" standard to govern the custody deci-
sion." The considerations which are enumerated in the statute are
designed to "codify existing law in most jurisdictions.71 3
Custody decisions are not only made at the time of a proceeding
for dissolution, but also under other circumstances. The Act is de-
signed to cover these cases also. 4 Custody proceedings may be
63. Prefatory Note, supra note 38 at 207.
64. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-321.
65. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-322. See also Prefatory Note, supra note 37 at 207.
66. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-322(2).
67. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-330(1)(a) and (b).
68. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-330(1).
69. See note 54 supra.
70. See note 56 supra.
71. Montana cases which have discussed modification of alimony have required that
there be a "substantial change" in the financial status, McLeod v. McLeod, 126 Mont. 32,
243 P.2d 321 (1952), or conditions which "demand a variation, alteration or revocation of
alimony and support payments." Daniels v. Daniels, 145 Mont. 57, 409 P.2d 824, 826 (1966).
72. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-332.
73. UMDA § 402 Comment.
74. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-331(4).
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brought by parents or non-parents, although a non-parent must
have physical custody of the child in order to petition for legal
custody.75 The UMDA permits the judge to interview the child to
ascertain his wishes as to custody and visitation, and, if needed,
seek advice of professional personnel as to the decision.7 The Act
also authorizes a full investigation and report on the child's custody
arrangement in contested custody cases, or upon request in non-
contested cases." Finally, the court may appoint an attorney to
represent the child's interests with respect to support, custody and
visitation.78
The non-custodial parent is to be given "reasonable visit-
ation rights" unless the court finds, after a hearing, that "visitation
would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral, or
emotional health."79 As with property distribution and maintenance
awards, child support awards are to be made without regard to
marital misconduct after considering the financial resources of the
child, of the custodial parent, of the non-custodial parent, and also
the particular needs of the child.8"
Child custody awards can be modified, but not without diffi-
culty. No modification is permitted for two years after the initial
decree unless "there is reason to believe the child's present environ-
ment may endanger seriously his physical, mental, moral, or emo-
tional health."'8' A change in custody can be made after this initial
two-year period only on the basis of facts which have arisen since
the earlier decree, or that were unknown at the time of the earlier
decree, and upon a finding that the circumstances of the child or
custodian have changed and the modification is necessary to serve
the best interest of the child.82 Even upon such findings, the present
custodian is to be retained unless there is consent to the change, or
the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with
the consent of the custodian, or thepresent environment endangers
him in some manner and the harm caused by the change is out-
weighed by the advantages to him.83 There is a firm policy behind
the section on modification that custody awards ought to be final,
and that a child needs stability in his living arrangements, particu-
larly after the dissolution of his or her parents' marriage. 84
75. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-331(4)(b).
76. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-334(1) and (2).
77. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-335.
78. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-324.
79. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-337.
80. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-323.
81. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339(1).
82. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339(2).
83. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339(2)(a),(b) and (c).
84. UMDA & 409 Comment.
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The Montana law dealing with child custody will not undergo
many changes as a result of the passage of the UMDA. The best
interest of the child has long been the standard applied in Montana
cases."5 Reasonable visitation rights to the non-custodial parent
have been recognized since the 1917 case of Kane v. Kane. 6 In the
past, modification of custody decrees in Montana has not been easy,
with most courts requiring a showing of "substantial change of cir-
cumstances" before such a shift will be made. However, the provi-
sion of the UMDA on modification suggests that a still more strin-
gent standard must now be followed. The Comments to this section
emphasize the necessity of final decisions, and assert a "presump-
tion that the present custodian is entitled to continue as the child's
custodian.""8 It will be necessary to wait for case law interpretation
to see whether Montana will interpret this section as propounding
a more stringent requirement. One definite change is found in the
statutory provision permitting the appointment of an attorney to
represent the child's interest in custody, support, and visitation.
Montana did not adopt the section of the UMDA dealing with
custody which provided that "neither fault nor any act of miscon-
duct on the part of the proposed custodian shall be considered un-
less it affects that person's relationship with the child."8 The failure
of the state to adopt this provision may permit the chief goal of the
UMDA to be thwarted in that there is again room for consideration
of fault. Clearly if marital misconduct or "fault" does not affect the
relationship of a person with his child, it should not be a factor in
the custody decision.
Conclusion
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides useful solu-
tions to the many aggravations of domestic relations law. By
excising the concept of fault from the law governing dissolution of
marriage and distribution of property following dissolution, the dis-
ruption in human lives which occurs at these times will hopefully
be lessened. Although nothing can make such proceedings pleasant,
the removal of acrimony should eliminate the law as a cause of
emotional damage which occurred during divorces in the past.
85. The most recent case using this standard is Gilmore v. Gilmore, - Mont. __
530 P.2d 480 (1975), interpreting R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4515, a statute repealed by the UMDA.
86. 53 Mont. 519, 165 P. 457 (1917).
87. Gilmore v. Gilmore, supra note 84 at 482.
88. UMDA § 409 Comment.
89. Callow, Custody of the Child and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S. DAK.
L. REV. 551, 555 (1973). The exact phrasing of the provision is: "The court shall not consider
conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child." UMDA §
402.
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This change in the philosophy underlying the law of divorce is
the major difference in the old Montana law and the new. The
provisions as to waiting periods, grounds, property division, mainte-
nance awards and custody explained above are all examples in
which this philosophy will be implemented. The cohesive reform
represented by this Act has been long needed in this state.
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